DRAF-7 AS OF 9 MAY 75

ISSUES

LEADING TO

DEFENSE KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

DKIQ

- I. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS
 - A. SOVIET GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN SAL.
 - B. MONITORING THE ABM TREATY, THE SAL INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORDS.
 - C. THE DEVELOPMENT, DEPLOYMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND FORCES RELATED TO SAL.
 - D. FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS AND THEIR INTERFACE WITH SAL.
- II. MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
 - A. SOVIET/WARSAW PACT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN MBFR.
 - B. SOVIET/WARSAW PACT POSTURES AND MOBILIZATION, REINFORCEMENT AND SUSTAINING CAPABILITIES.
 - C. SOVIET/WARSAW PACT TACTICAL NUCLEAR POSTURE AND DOCTRINE.
 - D. SOVIET/WARSAW PACT SUPPORT FORCES.

III. SOVIET EXPANSION AND INFLUENCE

- A. SOVIET STRATEGY, AID AND INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE HORN OF AFRICA.
- B. THE GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION OF SOVIET NAVAL, AIR AND MERCHANT ACTIVITIES.

Classified by SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE CADER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNCRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1983.

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A DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

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IV. SOVIET WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS (ITEMS NOT INCLUDED UNDER SPECIFIC ISSUES)

- A. BEAM WEAPONS
- B. SPACE WARFARE
- C. STRATEGIC WARFARE
- D. TACTICAL SUBMARINE WARFARE
- E. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
- F. VANTI-SHIP WARFARE
- G. AIR ATTACK
- H. AIR DEFENSE
- I. LAND WARFARE
- J. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
- K. VOCEAN SURVEILLANCE
- L. RECONNAISSANCE/INTELLIGENCE/DECEPTION
- M. ELECTRONIC WARFARE
- N. LOGISTICS

V. SOVIET/WARSAW PACT DEFENSE ECONOMICS/ACQUISITION PROCESS

- A. THE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF SOVIET/WARSAW PACT MEMBERS.
- B. THE SOVIET WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS.

VI. EUROPEAN/SOVIET AFFAIRS

- A. PORTUGUESE/SOVIET RELATIONS.
- D. YUGOSLAVIA AFTER TITO.

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VII. WESTERN EUROPE/NATO

- A. NATO VIABILITY AND READINESS FOR WAR WITH LA
 - B. NON-NATO BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

VIII. MIDDLE EAST

- A. MILITARY POSTURES AND THE PROSPECTS FOR WAR ME
- B. THREATS TO STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA.

IX. SUB-SAHARA AERICA

- A. SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.
- B. CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA
- C. THREATS TO STABILITY IN THE HORN AND EAST AFRICA.

X. LATIN AMERICA

- A. SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA.
- B. STABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA AS AFFECTED BY ARMS ACQUISITION AND MILITARY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS.

XI. SINO/SOVIET AFFAIRS

 V_A . THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR BETWEEN THE PRC AND \mathcal{U} / C_h

XII. PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

- A. PRC GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND CAPABILITIES IN ASIA.
- · B. THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN PRC LEADERSHIP.
 - C. THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF PRC STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

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XIII. NORTHEAST ASIA

- A. THE BALANCE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.
- B. THE EVOLVING POLICIES OF JAPAN REGARDING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND MILITARY AFFAIRS.

EA

XIV. SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

- A. THE FUTURE COURSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.
- B. THE STATUS OF US PERSONNEL NOT ACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
- NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTABILITIES IN SOUTH ASIA.

XV. WORLDWIDE AFFAIRS

- A. THE IMPACTS OF US WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA.
- B. TERRORISM.
- C. NUCLÉAR PROLIFERATION.
- D. THE POLITICS OF OIL.
- E. LAW OF THE SEA.
- F. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

52 ISSUES

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EUROPE: WARSAW PACT - NATO - MBFR

26. What are the size and composition of the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA)? Include in particular the size, composition, and deployment of the Soviet theater nuclear stockpile.

27. What are the capabilities, including the strengths and weaknesses, of the Warsaw Pact forces for conducting a war in the central region of Europe without prior reinforcement?

- What are the capabilities, including the strengths and weaknesses, of the Warsaw Pact forces to conduct a war in the central region of Europe starting from a posture which would deny warning to the NATO forces--i.e., without mobilization, prior reinforcement, or from an apparent low state of readiness?
- What are Warsaw Pact views, plans and doctrine for conducting war in Central Europe, including readiness, mobilization and reinforcement of Pact forces, and use of theater nuclear weapons?
- What are Warsaw Pact capabilities to fight a sustained non-nuclear war in Europe, including critical stockpiles and the operation of the rear services?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of non-US NATO forces for war in Europe and the intentions of these forces to react in the event of war with the Warsaw Pact?
- Estimate the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces under various conditions of NATO - Warsaw Pact conflict.

EASTERN EUROPE

How are political forces in Yugoslavia evolving, from the standpoints of internal cohesion and international alignment in the post-Tito period?

> Give attention to Soviet policy and activity toward Yugoslavia.

What trends and developments are likely in USSR-Eastern European relationships -- greater cohesion, greater autonomy, growing conflict?

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3. (C) There is considerable concern about the ever increasing Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare capability. You might consider adding an additional KIO:

"Soviet Chemical/Biological Warfare

What are the qualitative and quantitative Soviet capabilities to conduct offensive Chemical and Biological Warfare."

SOVIET ICBN SYSTEMS

What progress are the Soviets making toward a system capability

to interiere with or destroy U.S. satellites?

Consider electronic methods of attack on both the space and ground elements as well as physical attack on the satellite itself.

12. - What progress are the Soviets making, and what are their objectives, in increasing the countersilo capability of their silo-based ICBM forces?

Give particular attention to the accuracies of the Soviet SS-X-16, 17, 18 and 19 1C3M systems.

13. What progress are the Soviets making in improving the survivability of their ICBM forces? Consider whether the Soviets are developing and deploying land-mobile ICBMs, and if so, what progress is being made.

SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS

What are Soviet objectives in nuclear weapons technology, ved For Release 2001/08/31/16 A-RDP 80801500k900200230047-7

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DIA 20

XOK

...is being made toward deployment of, and reporting improvements in, a expansion of and improved reporting capabilities of satellite-borne ocean surveillance systems?

DIA 22

... defense against bombers aircraft and missiles...

OX

CIA 25 Add:

actions -- including concealment and deception--

These practices are worthy of note in a question of adherence.

NIO on DIA change to KIQ 20:

DIA change seems to say that Soviets have already deployed system - Communit has not agreed to such a judgment. Recommend keeping original language.

NIO on DIA change to KIQ 22:
Accept

NIO on CIA add on to KIQ 25:

Accept with addition of word any after including -- actions -- including any concealment and deception.

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20. What is the status of Soviet RDT&E, and what progress is being made toward deployment of, and reporting improvements in, a satellite-borne ocean surveillance system?

SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES

- 21. What progress are the Soviets making in ABM development, and what are their plans for further deployment?
- 22. What progress are the Soviets making in development and an orift deployment of defenses against bombers and missiles attacking at low altitudes?

SOVIET DEFENSE COSTS

23. What are the costs of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weapons systems and defense programs?

Include information on how they are financed; how they influence defense planning and overall economic planning and performance; and on how the Soviet weapons research and development and acquisition processes work.

ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS

- 24. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact objectives and positions in arms limitations negotiations?
- 25. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact intentions and actions -including any concerlment and deception -with respect to adherence to arms limitations agreements with
 the United States?